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The Constitutional Problem of Taxing Gifts as
Income: A Reply to Professor Mullockt
Louis A. Del Cof±o*
Having been characterized as an angel, perhaps I should
react with appropriate docility to Professor Mullock's kind effort
to clarify and explain my position on the subject of income
taxability of gifts. My instincts toward scholarly inquiry, how-
ver, have so overcome whatever angelic qualities I may have
that I feel constrained to reply, albeit briefly, to Mullock's paper.
I.
I have some difficulty with what Professor Mullock means
by the "ordinary language meaning" of the word income. If
common understanding is to determine the meaning of the word
"incomes" as used in the sixteenth amendment, then surely we
must look for the understanding which was prevalent in 1913 at
the time of the adoption of the sixteenth amendment.' Any
"common understanding" which prevails today, some 55 years
after the sixteenth amendment, will almost certainly be colored
by subsequently developed notions. For example, hourly workers
generally seem to think that nothing is income upon which there
is no tax withheld, and employer supplied meals and lodging are
generally thought to be non-taxable without regard to con-
venience of the employer. Similarly, and more correctly, gifts
may not be commonly regarded as income, but this is probably
because they have not been treated as such since the adoption of
the modern income tax. Since 1913, gifts, bequests, and in-
heritances have been specifically exempted from gross income
by section 102 of the 1954 Code, section 22 (b) (3) of the 1939 Code
and their counterparts in the various revenue acts. Thus, any
attempt to apply an "ordinary language" test to solve the prob-
lem of whether a gift is within the sixteenth amendment concept
of "incomes" requires an inquiry into the common understanding
prevalent in the past. Since I have recently written a good deal
on this subject,2 I will refrain from repeating myself here. I
t See this volume, supra at 247.
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519
(1920); Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1918).
2. Del Cotto, The Trust Annuity As Income: The Constitutional
Problem of Taxing Gifts and Bequests As Income, 23 TAx L. REV. 231
(1968).
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would much rather address myself to two other points made by
Professor Mullock.
II.
Professor Mullock agrees that Simmons v. United States3 is
authority for the proposition that Em income tax on receipt of a
gift is an indirect tax and thus valid without regard to the six-
teenth amendment, even though not apportioned. He does, how-
ever, disagree with the Court's reasoning process. For purposes
of accuracy, let me quote Professor LMfullock: 4
The argument, taken from the court's opinion in Simmons v.
United States, is as follows:
1. The estate, gift and inheritance tax law distinguishes be-
tween
(a) a tax on property imposed solely by reason of its owner-
ship, which is direct, and
(b) a tax upon the exercise of some, but not all, of the rights
adhering to ownership, such as use or transfer of prop-
erty, which is indirect and therefore not subject to the
requirement of apportionment.
2. A tax upon the donor of an inter vivos gift is indirect, being
merely a tax upon the exercise by the donor of the right to
transfer the property.
3. If a tax on giving property is indirect, so is a tax on receiv-
ing it, regardless of the source.
4. An income tax on the recipient of a gift is a tax upon the
receipt of property rather than upon the ownership of prop-
erty, and therefore is indirect.
So far as step (3) is concerned it may be doubted ... that
it follows from steps (1) and (2). While we may agree that
giving is one of the attributes of ownership, it is not so clear
that the same can be said of receiving. One second before a gift
is made the donor, as owner, has the right to make the gift; but
at that point in time the prospective donee is not the owner of
the subject matter of the gift and so does not have a right to
receive it based on ownership.
Mullock would appear to conclude, therefore, that because a
tax on receiving property is not a tax on an attribute of its
ownership, it is not an indirect tax.
Professor Mullock's analysis appears sound, except for the
conclusion that the tax is not indirect. Here Professor Mullock,
whose analytical style depends so much upon the syllogism,
seems to have committed the common syllogistic fallacy of the
undistributed middle: to say that all taxes on the exercise of
less than all of the numerous rights in property are indirect is
not to say that only such taxes are indirect and that all other
3. 308 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1962).
4. Footnotes are omitted.
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taxes are direct. Indeed, the very cases cited by Professor
Mullock in the course of his analysis indicate there is a class of
indirect tax in addition to a tax on the exercise of less than all
ownership rights, and that tax is a tax on the receipt of property.
In the interest of clarity and completeness, perhaps we
should begin near the beginning. In Scholey v. Rew 5 the Su-
preme Court held that the Civil War federal inheritance tax,
levied on the person who received the inheritance, was an in-
direct tax that did not require apportionment. The Court said
that an inheritance tax was the same as a tax on the receipt of
income, which had previously been held to be an indirect tax.6
This statement became questionable after the Court decided in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company7 that a tax on the
income from property was a direct tax on the property itself,
although the Court did not question the imposition of the in-
come tax upon personal service income.8 Any question that an
inheritance tax was indirect was removed, however, by Knowlton
v. Moore, where the Supreme Court held that the federal in-
heritance tax of 1898 was an indirect tax in the nature of a duty
or excise, which was outside the requirement of apportionment."0
Also, the Court pointed out that "the thing forming the universal
subject of taxation upon which inheritance and legacy taxes rest
is the transmission or receipt""1 of property, and went to great
lengths to reaffirm Scholey v. Rew.2
Thus, it seems clear that a tax on the exercise of less than
all ownership rights in property is not the only form of indirect
tax. A tax on the receipt of property is similarly indirect. In-
deed, in the sense that both taxes are upon the exercise of a
privilege there is nothing at all inconsistent or even different
about them. The Supreme Court discussed this point in New
York Trust Company v. Eisner 3 where the taxpayer attacked
the federal estate tax as unconstitutional, arguing that it was
direct and unapportioned. Knowlton was distinguishable, con-
5. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874).
6. Id. at 347, 348.
7. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
8. 158 U.S. at 637.
9. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
10. Although the Knowlton Court was not concerned with any dis-
tinction between transmission and receipt, it nevertheless concluded that
the tax was really on the legatee and not on the mass of the estate.
Id. at 66-69.
11. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 78-82.
13. 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
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tended the taxpayer, because it involved an inheritance tax
which was indirect because it could be avoided by disclaiming
the legacy, whereas in New York Trust Company an estate tax
was imposed on the passage of property at death and therefore
could not be avoided. The Court held that Knowlton controlled
as to both types of taxes; 14 that a tax on the transmission of
property at death was quite the same as a tax on the privi-
lege of receiving property, both being in the nature of an ex-
cise tax which is indirect. In Bromley v. McCaughn5 the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal gift tax as an
indirect tax on a single incident of ownership, the power to give
property to another, and could find no distinction between the
gift tax and the taxes on receipt of property involved in Knowl-
ton and Scholey v. Rew.16 And again, in Fernandez v. Weiner,'7
which upheld as an indirect tax the federal estate tax on com-
munity property at the death of one spouse,' 8 it was stated that:
If the gift of, property may be taxed, we cannot say that
there is any want of constitutional power to tax the receipt of it,
whether as a result of inheritance, [citation omitted] or other-
wise, whatever name may be given to the tax. ... Receipt
in possession and enjoyment is as much a taxable occasion
within the reach of the federal taxing power as the enjoyment
of any other incident of property.19
The reasoning of. the Simmons court, which is criticized by
Professor Mullock, is based squarely on the reasoning and au-
thority of the above cases.
Professor Mullock also states that my position-that a tax
upon the receipt of a gift is indirect-is so only if Congress
extends section 61(a) of the' Internal Revenue Code to cover
gifts [and repeals the gift exemption of section 102 (a)], and if
Congress repudiates its position that the section 61(a) meaning
of "income" is limited by the meaning of "incomes" in the six-
teenth amendment.
Assuming the validity of Mullock's position that "incomes"
in the sixteenth amendment, and hence in section 61 (a), must be
14. Id. at 348-49.
15. 280 U.S.-124 (1929).
16. Id. at 137.
17. 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
18. Id. at 361-62.
19. Id. at 353. This language was not used directly in support of




given an "ordinary language" meaning, I am still puzzled by
what he says. I take it that the correctness of my position can
be argued and established whether or not Congress chooses to
impose a tax on the receipt of gifts. If Congress does not so
choose, then my position I suppose is academic, but its accuracy
is in no way dependent upon a contrary choice by Congress.
Moreover, if Congress does choose to tax the receipt of a
gift under the income tax, I take it that an extension of section
61(a) to do so is at the same time a repudiation of whatever
position it may have taken regarding the "ordinary meaning"
of the word "income." More importantly, and contrary to Mul-
lock's implication, Congress may impose this very tax by way of
a section other than section 61(a). Some items not mentioned
specifically in section 61(a) are taxed by other sections of the
Code. For example, section 74 requires the inclusion in gross
income of certain prizes and awards and section 111, by implica-
tion, includes recoveries of items previously deducted which are
not within the "recovery exclusion." Indeed, the very article in
which I took the position that Mullock here criticizes, contains
an analysis of another such example which is the taxation of
the trust annuity under sections 102 (b) and 662 (a) of the Code.
Such sections treat trust distributions made in satisfaction of a
gift or bequest of a fixed dollar annuity as a distribution of in-
come to the extent of the distributable net income of the trust
and hence impose an income tax upon the receipt of a distribution
of principal, i.e., on the receipt of a gift of principal through the
medium of a trust. In response to the Court's holding in Burnet
v. Whitehouse 20 that a fixed dollar annuity is not in the nature
of income since it is a charge on the whole estate and does not
depend on the presence of income, Congress has in fact carved an
exception out of the exemption from tax contained in section
102 (a) for gifts of principal, and has done it by way of sections
102 (b) and 662 (a), without resort to section 61 (a) .21
20. 283 U.S. 148 (1931).
21. See Del Cotto, supra note 2.
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